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Key Findings 
• During a year of critical presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the risk of 
instability remains high, but a major military offensive by Russia is unlikely. Russian 
policy can be interpreted as a form of “strategic deterrence,” in which Moscow seeks to 
achieve its goals in Ukraine through a policy of active containment and strategic patience 
while avoiding overt military conflict. 
• In current Russian usage, “strategic deterrence” is the use of both military and non-
military means to prevent strategic gains by an opponent. It combines military means 
short of the use of force, such as an aggressive military build-up, with non-military 
tactics, including diplomacy, peace negotiations, information warfare, and political 
tactics. This strategy has allowed Russia to consolidate control of the Crimean peninsula, 
the Donbas region, and the Kerch Strait with only limited use of regular military forces.  
• In the longer term, however, the strategic deterrence mind-set poses problems for Russia. 
First, it escalates every local conflict in Russia’s borderlands into a high-level strategic 
game between Russia and the West, ensuring a long-term crisis in Moscow’s relations 
with the West, and limiting Russia's influence inside Ukraine. Second, instead of 
resolving conflicts, it produces militarized, stalemate-prone outcomes, leaving Russia 
entangled in a belt of semi frozen conflicts around its borders. 
 
After five years of war in the Donbas, with a death toll over 13,000, prospects for a peace deal 
have faded.1 Tensions have risen in the run-up to critical presidential elections in March 2019 
and parliamentary elections in October 2019. Ukrainian officials have warned of a possible 
Russian offensive, pointing to a military build-up along Ukraine’s borders, the seizure of 
Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait, and an upsurge in anti-Ukrainian rhetoric in Russian 
official media. In reality, a Russian land invasion is unlikely. Moscow’s policy can be interpreted 
as “strategic deterrence,” which aims to avoid any escalation of the armed conflict in eastern 
Ukraine, while continuing to use information campaigns and political tools to try to weaken 
Ukraine from within.  
                                                          
1 “Donbas War Death Toll Rises Up to Nearly 13,000—UN,” UNIAN Information Agency, January 22, 2019, 
https://www.unian.info/war/10416549-donbas-war-death-toll-rises-up-to-nearly-13-000-un.html. 
 
 
Referring to Russian policy as strategic deterrence may appear counterintuitive. Russia has 
annexed the Crimean peninsula, fueled a separatist war in Ukraine’s Donbas region, and 
deployed a powerful land army along the entire length of the border between Ukraine and 
Russia. On November 25, 2018, Russian border guards seized three Ukrainian naval vessels and 
detained 24 sailors after blocking their passage through to the Sea of Azov. An understanding of 
Russia’s concept of strategic deterrence helps to explain why such actions, which are viewed in 
the West as aggressive and destabilizing, can be interpreted in Moscow as essentially defensive 
and aimed at preventing conflict.  
As defined by the Russian Military Encyclopaedia, strategic deterrence is a “coordinated system 
of military and non-military measures, adopted sequentially or simultaneously … with the aim of 
constraining [an opponent] from any use of force, which [..] entails or threatens to entail damage 
on a strategic scale.”2 It is a concept that is grounded in—and continues to emphasize—
traditional ideas of nuclear deterrence, and also includes the use of conventional military force.3 
But central to Russia’s contemporary understanding of deterrence are such non-military tactics as 
diplomacy, peace talks, “information warfare,” and politics.4  
This emphasis on non-military tactics highlights similarities with the more common—but now 
highly politicized—concept of “hybrid war.”5 But strategic deterrence provides better insights 
into Russia’s current worldview, which characterises Russia as on the defensive against an 
expansionist campaign by the West. In this view, the United States and its allies have surrounded 
Russia with several concentric, tightening circles of containment—the “coils of the Anaconda,” 
as one recent article put it.6 The North American Treaty Organization (NATO) is the military 
instrument of this policy, deliberately fomenting what Russian analysts refer to as “managed 
chaos” [upravlyaemyi khaos] along Russia’s borders, using economic sanctions, “color 
revolutions” and information warfare, with the aim of ultimately challenging Russian statehood 
and sovereignty.  
  
                                                          
2 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Strategic Deterrence [Sderzhivanie strategicheskoe],” 
Encyclopedia [Entsiklopediya], undated, 
https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary. 
3 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence,” Survival, Vol. 58, No. 4, 2016, pp. 7–26; Anya 
Loukianova Fink, “The Evolving Russian Concept of Strategic Deterrence: Risks and Responses,” Arms Control 
Today Vol. 47, No. 6, 2016, pp. 14–20; see also Dmitry Adamsky, “From Moscow with Coercion: Russian 
Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture,” Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 41, No. 1-2, 2017, pp. 33–60. 
4 Article 36 of Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy promises that “interrelated political, military, military-
technical, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other measures are being developed and implemented in order 
to ensure strategic deterrence and the prevention of armed conflicts.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, 2015. 
5 For discussions of how “hybrid war” became politicized, see Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: 
Resurgence and Politicization, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018; for a wider critique of how the concept 
is deployed, see Bettina Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” Contemporary Politics, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2016, pp. 
283–300. 
6 “Strategiya i kontrstrategiya gibridnoi voiny” [Strategy and Counterstrategy of Hybrid War], Voennaya mysl’ 
[Military Thought], October 10, 2018, http://vm.milportal.ru/strategiya-i-kontrstrategiya-gibridnoj-vojny/. 
 
 
At times, Russia has responded to this perceived strategic threat with a policy of fragmentation 
and chaos, a set of “destabilization policies” that aim to undermine pro-Western, pro-NATO 
governments.7 But where Russia is in a position of strength, or wants to consolidate strategic 
gains, its preferred option is not chaos, but the imposition of order—on Russian terms. It uses 
strategic deterrence “to prevent the use of force” by an opponent, to contain an opponent “within 
certain limits,” and to “deescalate a military conflict.”8 Russia’s approach can be considered a 
form of active containment, which seeks to shape the strategic environment so that Russia can 
gain its strategic goals without having to resort to the use of force.  
In strategic deterrence theory, the active use of full-scale military force is a last resort, to be 
deployed only when deterrence has failed. A recent editorial in the Russian military journal, 
Voennaya Mysl’ [Military Thought], points to a growing belief that “to fight on the battlefield is 
the work of those who fail at politics and strategy.” Conquering territory, in this view, is “a 
burden, which drains resources and limits freedom of action.”9 It is viewed as much better to 
achieve strategic goals through such non-military means as smart diplomacy, covert actions, 
political machinations, and information warfare. 
 
Ukraine: The Logic of Strategic Deterrence 
Russia’s interpretation of the conflict in Ukraine fits easily into this world view. Russia 
characterizes the conflict as a civil war, provoked by a Western-backed coup d’etat in 2014. The 
government is considered a U.S.-backed puppet regime, which has, in Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov’s phrase, “Nazi and neo-Nazi characteristics” and is intent on expanding NATO up to the 
Russian frontier.10 In this way, whatever the local dynamics of the conflict, the Russian 
leadership has consistently characterized it as a strategic threat against which Moscow invokes 
the different mechanisms of strategic deterrence. As if to underline this point, President Vladimir 
Putin claims to have considered placing Russian strategic nuclear forces on alert during the 2014 
crisis on the Crimean peninsula.11  
Misleading threat assessments in Moscow produce Russian government policy responses that are 
often prone to misinterpretation. A week after the naval clash in the Kerch Strait in November 
2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko warned of a Russian plan to force a land corridor 
                                                          
7 Tatyana Malyarenko and Stefan Wolff , “The Logic of Competitive Influenceseeking: Russia, Ukraine, and the 
Conflict in Donbas,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2018, pp. 191–212 
8 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Strategic Deterrence [Sderzhivanie strategicheskoe],” 
Encyclopedia [Entsiklopediya], undated, 
https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary. 
9 “Strategiya i kontrstrategiya gibridnoi voiny” [Strategy and Counterstrategy of Hybrid War], Voennaya mysl’ 
[Military Thought], October 10, 2018, http://vm.milportal.ru/strategiya-i-kontrstrategiya-gibridnoj-vojny/. 
10 “Lavrov zayavil o planakh Ukrainy ustroit’ provokatsiyu na granitse s Krymom v dekabre” [Lavrov Made 
Announcement about Ukraine’s Plans to Create a Provocation on the Crimean Border in December], Kommersant, 
December 17, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3833809. 
11 Mathieu Boulegue, “The Russia-NATO Relationship Between a Rock and a Hard Place: How the ‘Defensive 
Inferiority Syndrome’ Is Increasing the Potential for Error,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2017, 
pp. 373–374. 
 
 
across Ukrainian territory from Donbas to Crimea through the strategic port of Mariupol.12 
General Viktor Muzhenko, commander of Ukraine’s armed forces, claimed that the military 
threat from Russia was at its highest since 2014.13 Analysts at the U.S.-based Institute for the 
Study of War echoed these warnings, concluding that the Russian military was actively preparing 
for military operations in Ukraine.14  
In Russia, President Putin’s spokesman dismissed Poroshenko’s claims of an imminent invasion 
as “absurd,” and accused Ukraine of provoking tensions.15 Lavrov warned that it was the 
Ukrainian government, not Russia, which was planning a “military provocation” on the border 
with Crimea.16 In this scenario, Poroshenko, who is running on the uncompromising campaign 
slogan of “Army, Language, Faith,” in the March presidential elections, was planning a military 
offensive to bolster his lagging poll ratings with an appeal to Ukrainian patriotism.17 Should he 
try anything, warned Lavrov, “he’ll receive an answer, and not a small one.” 18  
A Ukrainian offensive was always highly unlikely, but there seems to have been a genuine belief 
in Moscow that a “wag the dog”-style attack was possible. Rather than get drawn into an armed 
conflict, strategic deterrence proposes a wide range of military tactics, short of the use of force, 
to deter any such provocations. Suggested tactics include “the demonstration of military presence 
and military force;” “the protection and defense of the state border in the air, on land, and on 
sea;” “a demonstrative transfer of forces from a peace to a war footing;” or а “substantial build-
up (deployment) of groups (of forces).”19 
Throughout 2018, Russia carried out exactly these types of military maneuvers around Crimea 
and along Ukraine’s borders. The media has been full of blurred photographs of hundreds of 
tanks conveniently parked, en masse, for satellites to capture, although many of them appear to 
                                                          
12 “Rossiya pytaetsya probit’ sukhoputnyi koridor v Krym—Poroshenko,” [Russia Attempts to Penetrate the Land 
Corridor to the Crimea-Poroshenko], UNIAN Information Agency, December 2, 2018, 
https://www.segodnya.ua/politics/rossiya-pytaetsya-probit-suhoputnyy-koridor-v-krym-poroshenko-1194221.html. 
13 “Russian Threat Highest Since 2014: Ukraine Military Chief,” Reuters, December 4, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-military/russian-threat-highest-since-2014-ukraine-military-
chief-idUSKBN1O32IV. 
14 Catherine Harris, Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, et al, “Warning Update: Russian Preparations for 
Military Operations in Ukraine Continue,” Institute for the Study of War, December 23, 2018, 
https://iswresearch.blogspot.com/2018/12/warning-update-russian-preparations-for.html.  
15 Ukraine Sends Troops to Russian Border Amid Fears of an ‘Invasion,’” Telegraph, December 4, 2018, 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/12/03/ukraine-sends-troops-russian-border-amid-fears-invasion/. 
16 “Lavrov zayavil o planakh Ukrainy ustroit’ provokatsiyu na granitse s Krymom v dekabre” [Lavrov Made 
Announcement about Ukraine’s Plans], Kommersant, December 17, 2018, 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3833809. 
17 “Kak Rossiiskaia armiia budet pirnuzhdat’ Ukrainu k miru” [How the Russian Army will need Ukraine to achieve 
peace], Vzglyad, December 18, 2018, https://vz.ru/politics/2018/12/18/955926.html; “Lavrov zayavil o planakh 
Ukrainy ustroit’ provokatsiyu na granitse s Krymom v dekabre” [Lavrov Made Announcement about Ukraine’s 
Plans], Kommersant, December 17, 2018, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3833809. 
18 “Lavrov zayavil o planakh Ukrainy ustroit’ provokatsiyu na granitse s Krymom v dekabre” [Lavrov Made 
Announcement about Ukraine’s Plans],  Kommersant, December 17, 2018, 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3833809. 
19 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Strategic Deterrence [Sderzhivanie strategicheskoe],” 
Encyclopedia [Entsiklopediya], undated, 
https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary. 
 
 
be obsolete.20 Data pointing to a military build-up can easily be misread as the precursor to a 
major offensive, but the build-up is much more likely to be a deterrence mechanism, aiming to 
deter any attempt by the Ukrainian military to recapture the Donbas by force, inevitably dragging 
Russia into a dangerous open conflict. As one Russian newspaper phrased it: “The Russian group 
[of forces] is being deployed to pacify the aggressor, who is attempting by military means to 
destroy the unrecognised republics of Donbass.”21 According to the chief of the General Staff, 
General Valery Gerasimov, the military build-up was designed to counter any “provocations” by 
“unfriendly forces,” and to “guarantee security.”22 
Strategic deterrence aims to constrain not only the actions of an enemy, but also of allies and 
proxies. Backing a separatist movement in the Donbas helped Russia maintain the fiction of non-
involvement, but also created risks and vulnerabilities. Moscow quickly stamped on any signs of 
autonomy among leaders of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” 
(DNR/LHR) that emerged in the Donbas. These efforts were sometimes aided by the untimely 
deaths of numerous Donbas leaders.23 Russia promoted new, more pliant elites in their place, 
answerable to Moscow’s curators and not the local population. These new elites in the Donbas 
have taken over lucrative sectors of the economy for their own benefit though corporate raiding 
and the nationalization of industries, making them reluctant to lose their newfound wealth and 
status and therefore relatively easy for Moscow to manage.24  
 
Peace Talks and Diplomacy 
Military dominance and control of proxies ensures command of the strategic environment, within 
which other non-military instruments can be deployed. Strategic deterrence includes the 
“conduct of negotiations through diplomatic channels” and “initiatives to strengthen inter-state 
relations” as part of a holistic approach to strategic thinking.25 Peace talks and diplomacy play an 
important role—not as alternatives to military activities, but as complementary policy options to 
achieve the same strategic goals.26  
                                                          
20 Michael Kofman, “Is a Russian Military Operation Against Ukraine Likely in the Near Future?” December 26, 
2018, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/12/26/is-a-russian-military-operation-against-ukraine-
likely-in-the-near-future/. 
21 “Kak Rossiiskaia armiia budet pirnuzhdat’ Ukrainu k miru” [How the Russian army will need Ukraine to achieve 
peace], Vzglyad, December 18, 2018, https://vz.ru/politics/2018/12/18/955926.html. 
22 “RF ogranichivaet lyubye illiuzii nedrugov: ekspert rasskazal o znachenii gruppirovki voysk v Krymu” [Russian 
Federation Limits any Illusions of Enemies: Expert told about the importance of the grouping of troops in the 
Crimea],  Ekonomika segodnya [Economics Today], November 7, 2018, https://rueconomics.ru/287329-rf-
ogranichivaet-lyubye-illyuzii-nedrugov-ekspert-rasskazal-o-znachenii-gruppirovki-voisk-v-krymu. 
23 Yulia Abibok, “The Republic Lives on and Is Managed by Rumours,” Open Democracy, February 19 2019, 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/yulia-abibok/the-republics-east-ukraine-donetsk-luhansk. 
24 Tetyana Malyarenko, “Evolving Dynamics and Conflict Potential in Eastern Ukraine,” PONARS Memo No. 569, 
January 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/evolving-dynamics-and-conflict-potential-eastern-ukraine. 
25 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Strategic Deterrence [Sderzhivanie strategicheskoe],” 
Encyclopedia [Entsiklopediya], undated, 
https://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary. 
26 A similar interaction between peace talks and Russian military and political initiatives can be seen in the Astana 
peace process on Syria and Russia’s peace initiatives in relation to Afghanistan.  
 
 
Russia has repeatedly used peace negotiations around Ukraine to consolidate its strategic gains 
and to normalize its de facto control of Crimea, the Sea of Azov, and the Donbas. The two Minsk 
Agreements of September 2014 and February 2015 achieved vital ceasefires, but on terms that 
were largely advantageous to Moscow and thus have consequently never been implemented in 
full by Kiev.27 The Minsk accords also further institutionalized the DNR and LNR, abetted by a 
policy of isolation pursued by Kiev; embedded local elites; and encouraged a Donbas identity 
project that threatens to make long-term reintegration more difficult. 28  
More recently, after the November 25 seizure of Ukrainian ships, Russia rejected a German 
proposal to extend the mandate of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) monitoring mission in Donbas to the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Straits, but invited 
French and German experts on a limited one-time monitoring visit. This initiative excluded 
Ukraine and risked providing tacit international recognition of Russia’s de facto control over the 
strait, prompting European Union diplomats to backtrack.29  
The 2018 discussions of a possible United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in the Donbas 
followed a similar logic. A September 2017 Russian proposal for UN peacekeeping forces to be 
deployed in Eastern Ukraine envisaged a lightly armed force to accompany OSCE monitors 
along the front line between the two sides. Western and Ukrainian diplomats responded with a 
proposal to extend UN peacekeeping troops across the entire territory of the DNR and LNR, 
including the Ukrainian-Russian border, while installing a civil administration to oversee 
security and new elections.30  
Such a maximalist proposal was unacceptable to Russia, concerned that a UN administration 
“may create conditions for a unilateral resolution of the conflict by force on the part of Kyiv.”31 
Lavrov views a powerful UN administration in the region as potentially “turning into a military-
political commandant’s office, which will take the entire territory of the self-proclaimed 
republics ... and will decide for itself whom to elect and how to elect.”32  
                                                          
27 Andreas Umland, “The Glazyev Tapes, Origins of the Donbas Conflict, and Minsk Agreements,” Foreign Policy, 
September 13, 2018, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2018/09/13/the-glazyev-tapes-origins-of-the-donbas-conflict-
and-minsk-agreements/. 
28 Tatyana Malyarenko and Stefan Wolff, “The Logic of Competitive Influence Seeking: Russia, Ukraine, and the 
Conflict in Donbas,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 4, 2018, p. 199. 
29Vladimir Socor, “Moscow and Kyiv Respond to German Proposal on the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea (Part One),” 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 16, No. 6, January 22, 2019; Vladimir Socor, “Moscow and Kyiv Respond to German 
Proposal on the Kerch Strait and Azov Sea (Part Two),” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 16, No. 8, January 24, 2019; 
“Russia Says Putin Has Allowed German Experts to Monitor Kerch Strait,” Moscow Times, January 18, 2019, 
https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-says-putin-has-allowed-german-experts-to-monitor-kerch-strait-64196. 
30 Leonid Bershidsky, “How to Fix the Eastern Ukraine Problem,” Bloomberg, February 14, 2018, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-14/how-to-fix-the-eastern-ukraine-problem. 
31 Sergei Utkin, “If Ukraine Does Not Attempt to Make Progress Towards Resolution, Other Stakeholders Will 
Adopt the Wait-and-See Approach,” Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: Prospects and Parameters of UN Peacekeeping 
Mission in Donbass, Razumkov Center, August 2018. 
32 “Ne rvat’ i ne vypolnyat’. Yest’ li shansy u Minska-2 posle chetyrekh let peregovorov” [Don’t rip it up and don’t 
comply: Are there any chances for Minsk-2 after four years of negotiations], Carnegie Moscow Center, February 12, 
2018, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78336. 
 
 
There has been a rush of think-tank reports trying to narrow the gap between these two visions of 
peacekeeping. But the two positions do not just differ in policy nuance that can be overcome by 
clever diplomacy. In the Western view, peacekeeping is a route to resolving an internal conflict 
and producing a just peace. Russian thinking on strategic deterrence views peacekeeping as 
primarily an instrument for managing and controlling a conflict for strategic advantage. Bridging 
this conceptual gap may prove insurmountable.  
 
 
Politics and Information Warfare 
The Russian military views information warfare as central to effective strategy, to be used as “a 
crisis management tool that can prevent aggression without direct employment of military 
force.”33 Information war is not simply the production of fake news, but about something much 
deeper—a war of meanings, a struggle over fundamental concepts and the interpretation of 
events.34 At its most basic, the two sides struggle over the interpretation of the conflict: for 
Russia, it is an internal Ukrainian civil war; Ukraine considers it “a proxy war by Russia,” in 
which the separatist authorities are defined by law as “the Russian occupational 
administrations.”35  
Opinion polls suggest that Russia is losing this war of meanings in Ukraine: 80 percent of those 
polled agree that “Russia is the aggressor country, which has illegally annexed Crimea and is 
leading an ongoing aggression against Ukraine,” and over 70 percent believe that “[t]he goal of 
the current regime in Russia is to destroy Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.”36  
Nevertheless, these headline figures disguise a complex political landscape. Political shifts are 
always possible in a country where 70 percent of citizens believe that “things in Ukraine are 
going in the wrong direction.”37 Popular discontent, primarily over the economy and high-level 
corruption, offers fertile ground for more populist candidates, such as comedian actor 
Volodymyr Zelenski, a front-runner in the March presidential elections, and who may be open to 
a more accommodating policy towards Russia.38  
                                                          
33 Adamsky, 2018, p. 41. 
34 “Strategiya i kontrstrategiya gibridnoi voiny,” Voennaya mysl’ [Military Thought], October 10, 2018, 
http://vm.milportal.ru/category/stati/.  
35 Tetyana Malyarenko, “Evolving Dynamics and Conflict Potential in Eastern Ukraine,” PONARS Memo No. 569, 
January 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/evolving-dynamics-and-conflict-potential-eastern-ukraine. 
36 Russian-Ukrainian Conflict: Prospects and Parameters of Un Peacekeeping Mission in Donbass, Razumkov 
Center, August 2018. Similar percentages were recorded in an International Republican Institute-sponsored poll in 
June 2018, see Center for Insights in Survey Research, “Public Opinion Survey of Resident of Ukraine, September 
29–October 14, 2018,” undated, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018.11.30_ukraine_poll.pdf. 
37 Center for Insights in Survey Research, “Public Opinion Survey of Resident of Ukraine, September 29–October 
14, 2018,” undated, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018.11.30_ukraine_poll.pdf. 
38 “Kolomoiskii ili Kreml’. Kak kaveenshchik Zelenskii izmenit vybory prezidenta Ukrainy” [Kolomoisky or 
Kremlin. How The Caucasian Zelenskiy will change the election of the president of Ukraine], Carnegie.ru, January 
21, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78161. 
 
 
But Russia lacks creative ideas on how to reshape the political-informational space in its favour, 
still relying on President Putin’s closest Ukrainian friend, oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, to 
marshal pro-Russian forces through his media outlets and at elections. Medvedchuk is leading  
the Opposition Platform-For Life coalition, but its presidential candidate, Yuri Boiko, is 
struggling to reach 10 percent in opinion polls; a smart campaign by Zelenski could take away 
some of his potential voters.39 
More covert political initiatives have also proved unsuccessful for Russia. Plans by Russian 
hardliners for a Bosnia and Herzegovina model for Ukraine, involving the effective breakup of 
the country into culturally distinct zones, now appear far-fetched.40 Russian speakers in the east 
and south and small Hungarian and Romanian minorities in western Ukraine have proved 
resistant to any covert mobilization by Moscow, despite a divisive education bill passed in 2017 
that restricted minority-language education. Even in the breakaway republics, polls suggest a 
majority would prefer to remain as part of Ukraine.41  
 
Conclusion 
Rather than interpreting Russia as always on the verge of a new military offensive, strategic 
deterrence is a form of Russian policy that promotes active containment, which entails both 
offensive and defensive logic. Russia uses all military measures, short of the use of force, to 
contain the conflict in the Donbas, controlling its own proxies and deterring any offensive action 
by Kiev, while waiting to take advantage of any political opportunities that come out of 
Ukraine’s own internal political problems. 
In many ways, Russia’s policy of strategic patience has been relatively successful. Russia has so 
far consolidated its control of Crimea effectively and appears intent on achieving control over the 
Sea of Azov. It maintains effective control over separatist forces and can escalate or deescalate 
the conflict with ease. Strategic deterrence encourages holistic, longer-term thinking, whereas the 
EU and the United States have often been caught in reaction mode, on the back foot against 
more-agile Russian diplomacy. 
But in the longer term, Russia’s Ukraine policy faces significant challenges. Above all, Russia’s 
Manichean worldview and its outdated view of Ukraine need to evolve. Dmitri Trenin, head of 
                                                          
39 “Kolomoiskii ili Kreml’. Kak kaveenshchik Zelenskii izmenit vybory prezidenta Ukrainy,” Carnegie.ru, January 
21, 2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78161. 
40 “Sergei Glazev: Urkainu okkupirovali amerikanskie spetssluzhby” [Sergey Glazyev: American Special Services 
Occupied Ukraine], Izborsky Club, August 20, 2018, https://izborsk-club.ru/15745. Glazyev was also featured in the 
so-called “Glazyev tapes,” recordings in which he also appears to have been fomenting unrest in Ukraine’s 
provinces. See Andreas Umland, “The Glazyev Tapes, Origins of the Donbas Conflict, and Minsk Agreements,” 
Foreign Policy Association, September 13, 2018, https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2018/09/13/the-glazyev-tapes-
origins-of-the-donbas-conflict-and-minsk-agreements/. 
41 In a December 2016 poll, 35 percent of those polled supported a special status within Ukraine, while 21 percent 
supported integration in Ukraine without status. Some 33 percent advocated joining Russia with autonomous status, 
and only 11 percent supported joining Russia without conditions. See Gwendolyn Sasse, “The Donbas—Two Parts, 
or Still One? The Experience of War through the Eyes of the Regional Population,” ZOiS Report, No. 2, May 2017, 
p. 12. 
 
 
the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that Russia will continue to struggle to gain traction in 
Ukraine until Russian elites begin to accept that the project of an independent, European state is  
shared by almost all Ukrainian elites.42 Until Russian elites can rethink their relationship with 
Kiev, the two states will remain in what Gleb Pavlovsky calls a geopathological embrace, in 
which Russia’s “only desire is a toxic one, to break the will of the other side.”43 
 
This conservative mind-set is fully reflected in the nature of strategic deterrence, which is a 
relatively effective policy for controlling conflict, but a policy that resists change and therefore 
unable to resolve underlying political problems. Russia’s strategic approach to conflict 
management and peace processes has produced a string of unresolved conflicts from Moldova to 
Georgia that increasingly hamper Russia’s freedom of movement as a major power in Europe. In 
seeking to guarantee that Russia cannot lose, deterrence theory also makes it very difficult for 
Russia to win. 
Finally, although the policy aims to deescalate or contain conflict, it does so through escalatory 
military build-ups and sometimes risky enforcement mechanisms that could be misread. Since 
Russian deterrence policies often lack coherent signaling and eschew confidence-building 
measures, these activities pose a danger of provoking an unexpected response, or spiraling out of 
control. During a high-stakes election year, and with relations between Russia and the West at an 
all-time low, the chances of miscalculation remain unacceptably high.  
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